Google Moves Delhi High Court To Modify Aniruddha Joshi Personality Rights Order, Challenges Takedown Obligation For ‘Similar Content’

Google Moves Delhi High Court To Modify Aniruddha Joshi Personality Rights Order, Challenges Takedown Obligation For ‘Similar Content’

Introduction

The Delhi High Court is presently examining Google LLC’s plea seeking modification of an interim John Doe injunction passed in the personality rights suit instituted by Dr. Aniruddha Dhairyadhar Joshi. The controversy concerns the scope of the earlier order dated 24 February 2026, which not only directed takedown of specifically identified infringing URLs but also extended the restraint to “similar content.” Google has argued that such a direction effectively compels the intermediary to independently adjudicate legality of future content under threat of contempt, contrary to settled intermediary liability principles. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela heard the matter and emphasized the need to strike a careful balance between personality rights, public discourse, and intermediary obligations.

Factual background

The underlying suit was filed by Dr. Aniruddha Dhairyadhar Joshi seeking protection of his personality rights against misuse of his identity, image, likeness, and online persona. On 24 February 2026, the Delhi High Court passed an interim John Doe injunction directing removal of identified infringing links and further extending the order to “content similar to the infringing content.”

Google did not dispute its obligation to remove URLs specifically identified and adjudicated by the Court. However, it objected to the broader obligation requiring action on plaintiff-flagged future content allegedly similar in nature. According to Google, this creates uncertainty by forcing the intermediary to decide whether newly flagged content falls within the judicial determination, thereby exposing it to contempt risk if its assessment differs from the plaintiff’s position. A related dispute also arose concerning the plaintiff’s demand for disclosure of Basic Subscriber Information (BSI) relating to allegedly infringing links that had not yet been specifically adjudicated by the Court.

Procedural background

The matter came up before the Delhi High Court on Google LLC’s application seeking modification of paragraph 38 of the interim order dated 24 February 2026. Google requested that the “similar content” portion be suitably clarified or narrowed so that it is not required to independently assess legality of non-adjudicated uploads. The plaintiff opposed the application, arguing that such flexibility is the very purpose of a John Doe injunction, especially in online personality rights cases involving recurring misuse by unknown actors.

Issues

1. Whether the direction requiring takedown of “similar content” impermissibly obliges Google to independently adjudicate legality of future uploads.

2. Whether the plaintiff must approach the Court each time additional infringing content is discovered.

3. Whether Basic Subscriber Information for non-adjudicated links can be disclosed without a specific judicial order.

Contentions of parties

Google contended that it has no difficulty complying with orders relating to specifically identified URLs that have already been adjudicated by the Court. However, it argued that extending the injunction to “similar content” effectively requires the intermediary to make legal determinations on future content, which is contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India. According to Google, intermediaries are only required to act upon court orders or government notifications and cannot be compelled to proactively determine legality across vast volumes of uploads.

On disclosure, Google further argued that Basic Subscriber Information relates to third-party user data and cannot be disclosed merely on the plaintiff’s request unless the Court specifically directs such disclosure.

Dr. Joshi, through Senior Advocate Rajshekhar Rao, opposed the plea by arguing that Google’s stand amounted to a contradiction of its own content moderation policies, which already permit removal of content involving misuse of a person’s name, image, or likeness. It was submitted that requiring the plaintiff to move the Court separately for every fresh infringing upload would defeat the very object of a John Doe injunction in digital personality rights litigation.

Reasoning and analysis

During the hearing, the Court noted the broader policy implications of such directions in personality rights cases. Justice Gedela observed that public figures asserting personality rights must also tolerate a certain degree of criticism, disagreement, and even ridicule as part of public discourse. The Court therefore stressed that not every use of a person’s likeness can automatically be treated as infringing.

The Bench appeared conscious of the practical difficulty faced by intermediaries when required to evaluate whether newly flagged content is genuinely infringing or merely falls within satire, criticism, or legitimate commentary. It remarked that “nobody can say with certainty that this is right and this is wrong,” emphasizing the need for calibrated judicial directions that do not convert intermediaries into adjudicatory bodies.

A significant issue flagged by the Court was procedural burden: whether the intermediary should itself approach the Court for clarification when doubtful content is flagged, or whether the plaintiff should be required to seek fresh judicial directions in such instances. This question remains central because any final ruling could shape the contours of future John Doe injunctions in online personality rights enforcement.

Decision

The Delhi High Court did not decide the modification application at this stage. Instead, it granted Dr. Joshi four weeks to file a reply to Google’s application, with liberty to Google to file a rejoinder within two weeks thereafter. The matter has been listed for further hearing in mid-May 2026, where the Court is expected to consider the balance between enforceability of personality rights injunctions and the limits of intermediary obligations.