US District Court favors Pinterest in copyright infringement suit by estate of photographer Blaine Harrington III

US District Court favors Pinterest in copyright infringement suit by estate of photographer Blaine Harrington III

Cites the case of Harold Davis, wherein infringing fell under the purview of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe Harbor

The US District Court for the Northern District of California has ruled in favor of Pinterest, Inc. in a copyright infringement suit filed by Maureen Harrington on behalf of the estate of a professional photographer, Blaine Harrington III.

The court noted that Pinterest, the American social media platform, was protected under the provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Safe Harbor.

In the suit, Harrington alleged that Pinterest infringed on the estate’s copyrighted photographs by displaying them in notifications to users off-site.

The court had to deal with whether the platform’s email, in-app, and mobile push notifications containing copyrighted images were beyond the purview of the DMCA norms.

Earlier, a similar lawsuit was filed against Pinterest by Harold Davis, another professional photographer.

While ruling on the matter, the court had held that Pinterest’s display of user-uploaded works next to the advertisements fell under the provisions of the DMCA. It added that Davis failed to justify that the platform knew about the contributory infringement and took advantage of it.

In the present case, the court analyzed whether Pinterest’s actions represented ‘storage at the direction of a user’ under Section 512 (c) of the DMCA. It observed that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not address the issue of whether notifications fell under the DMCA.

The District Court thus held that the activities “directed towards enhancing the accessibility of posts” were eligible for protection. The judge stated that Pinterest’s notifications comprising hyperlinks to content meant “access-facilitating.”

The bench clarified, “There appears to be little difference between an infringing display via web browser, which was entitled to safe harbor in the Davis case, and an infringing display via email.”

It furthered that in both cases, the platform’s service offered a hyperlink, which (on clicking), requested the image from the server, and displayed it. while justifying that since a hyperlink in an email and on a browser connected back to images, there was reason why, in one form, the display would arise “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user,” where in the other, the result would be nil.

However, Harrington submitted that because the alleged infringement did not happen on the social media platform, it was not that it did not “enhance accessibility” and did not fall in the protected category.

However, the District Court said that Harrington’s logic was unfounded. It added that the Court of Appeals had no intention to restrict the DMCA provision to instances where infringement was shown on a website. The bench said, as defined in previous cases, Pinterest’s algorithmic display of Pins (even in notifications) directed the user to ‘storage’.

Meanwhile, Harrington asserted there were genuine disputes of material facts that called for a preventive summary judgment, arguing that Pinterest’s notifications contained ads.

However, the bench considered it inconsequential and held, “The courts have not withheld the Safe Harbor protection simply because service providers advertise on their platforms alongside user-uploaded content.”

When Harrington claimed that the platform’s notifications displayed images using means other than hyperlinks, the court declined to deliberate on the matter due to the loss of substantial proof.

Nevertheless, the bench weighed on whether Pinterest had actual or ‘red flag’ knowledge of the infringement. It stated that the onus of such knowledge was on the copyright owner.

At this, Pinterest asserted that no evidence was in the record to show the requisite knowledge. The social media platform’s advocate stated that Harrington offered no evidence or argument in response.

Thus, the court observed that the only relevant evidence suggested that the social media platform had no actual knowledge of the infringement. That’s because Harrington never sent a takedown notice or other communication identifying the infringing material to Pinterest.

The bench also examined whether Pinterest received a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” and if it possessed the “right and ability to control such activity.”

The District Court ruled that the burden to prove it was on the service provider, but it neither benefited financially nor had the right and ability to control infringement.

The bench noted that the American social media platform’s control over its algorithms and ads did not “constitute the kind of control that is necessary to lose safe harbor protection.”

While noting that the decision in the Davis case was persuasive on the particular aspect, the court held that the connection between Pinterest’s algorithms and ads was insufficient to show a “right and ability to control” the alleged infringement.

On the matter regarding financial benefits, the bench ruled that there was no evidence that Pinterest gained due to the infringing activity. It explained The court explained, “A directly attributable financial benefit requires that ‘some revenue (should) be distinctly attributable to the infringing material at issue.”

Thus, it rejected the Harrington argument that a general increase in platform viewership from an allegedly infringing display was sufficient. The court added that no evidence was provided wherein Pinterest was shown to be marketing itself to advertisers as containing infringing material. Similarly, nothing denoted that the social media platform contained ‘vast’ amounts of infringing substance.

While granting Pinterest’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that the social media platform had done its duty of proving that it came under the purview of DMCA provisions.