The Commissioner of Delhi Municipal Corporation (DMC) is the Disciplinary Authority of municipal officers of the DMC: Delhi HC
The question of law that arose before the Delhi High Court was as to the competent authority to take disciplinary action(s) and impose penalties on the municipal officers and other municipal employees under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (the Act).The respondent – Rajesh Sharma was appointed as Junior Engineer in the year 1978 and, was gradually elevated to higher posts...
The question of law that arose before the Delhi High Court was as to the competent authority to take disciplinary action(s) and impose penalties on the municipal officers and other municipal employees under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (the Act).
The respondent – Rajesh Sharma was appointed as Junior Engineer in the year 1978 and, was gradually elevated to higher posts on promotions. In 1997, he was appointed as Executive Engineer (Civil) on the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) in consultation with Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). It surfaced that during the said period, he, alongwith one S.B. Bhardwaj - Assistant Engineer, was convicted in 2011 for the commission of the offences under Sec.13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PoC Act) and, under Sections 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
He averred that the competent authority to take disciplinary action against him was the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Corporation), and not the Commissioner of the Corporation. Therefore, his dismissal order was not sustainable in law.
The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) held that the question of competence of the Commissioner – or rather the lack of it, to act as the Disciplinary Authority in respect of Group “A” officers of the Corporation was no more res integra, and therefore, quashed the dismissal. The petitioner North Delhi Municipal Corporation (NrDMC) approached the High Court of Delhi assailing the impugned order passed by CAT.
The High Court held that the invocation of the principle that a general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication, in the context of Section 59(d) and Section 95(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, was erroneous.
The Commissioner was the Disciplinary Authority of the respondent and had the competence by virtue of Section 59(d) to act as the Disciplinary Authority against the respondent and to dismiss him from service.
The Commissioner was appointed by the Central Government and was statutorily named and recognized as the custodian of the entire executive power of the Corporation for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act or under any other Act in force which conferred any power, or imposed any duty on the Corporation. He could exercise all powers and perform all the duties specifically conferred or imposed upon him by the Act, or by any other law for the time being in force. He was also empowered to prescribe the duties of, and exercise supervision and control over the acts and proceedings of all the municipal officers and other municipal employees, except those specifically excluded in Section 59(b) of the Act.
The High Court noted that if the Parliament intended to continue to deprive the Commissioner from acting as the Disciplinary Authority in respect of Municipal Officers and other employees – except to the limited extent stipulated in DMC Services (Control & Appeal) Regulations, 1959, the Parliament would not have designated the Commissioner as the Disciplinary Authority in relation to all Municipal Officers and other Municipal Employees by amending clause (d) of Section 59 of the Act.
The Court noted that the very object and purpose of the amendment – which was to enlarge the scope of the authority of the Commissioner, and to empower him to carry out his statutory obligations would be defeated if, despite the amendment in the Act, his power to take disciplinary action were limited by reference to the Regulations of 1959, which were framed when the Act – as originally enforced, was materially different. Further, the mischief rule of interpretation also does not support the conclusion that the Regulations of 1959 cloud the power of the Commissioner to act as the disciplinary authority.
The Commissioner is named as the Disciplinary Authority of all Municipal Officers and other Municipal Employees, except in respect of whom, he cannot be the Disciplinary Authority. The Commissioner has the power to suspend and dismiss all such Municipal Officers and other Municipal Employees whom he has the power to appoint by virtue of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. He would not act as the Disciplinary Authority of only those Officers/ employees, who are appointed by the Standing Committee, or the Corporation. But in all other cases, he is the Disciplinary Authority.
The High Court set aside the impugned decision of the Tribunal.
Justice Vipin Sanghi and Justice A.K. Chawla presided over the case.